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COMPULSORY LICENSES IN PEER-TO-PEER FILE 
SHARING: A WORKABLE SOLUTION? 
Michael Botein' 
Edward Samuels" 
INTRODUCTION 
Peer-to-peer sharing of creative works over the Internet poses a particularly 
thorny issue for copyright law. On the one hand, full copyright liability may seem 
inappropriate in such an environment, since it might inhibit the broad 
dissemination of creative works promised by the new technology. On the other 
hand, carte blanche immunity from copyright liability might erode the commercial 
value of creative works. l 
In an effort to chart a course between the two unsatisfactory extremes, some 
commentators have recently proposed a compulsory license to authorize and 
regulate the peer-to-peer distribution of copyrighted works, primarily over the 
Internet.2 We are sympathetic with the goals of such a compromise, and believe 
that the issues need to be fully aired. Nevertheless, we remain skeptical about the 
feasibility of implementing such a system. To this end, we think it worthwhile to 
take a brief look at the history of compulsory copyright licenses in a number of 
different settings. As will be seen, compulsory licenses have been less than 
successful in implementing public policy goals. 
* 
** 
I. 
2. 
Distinguished University Visiting Professor, Southern Illinois University Law School, 2005-2006. 
Professor of Law and Director, Media Center, New York Law School. B.A., 1966, Wesleyan 
University; 1.0., 1969, Cornell University'S; LL.M., 1972, Columbia University; J.S.D., 1979, 
Columbia University. 
Intellectual Property Consultant, New York City, www.edwardsamuels.com. B.A., 1971, Yale 
University; 1.0.,1974, Columbia University. 
Immunity could undermine the primary purpose of copyright law, which is to foster the creation of 
new works by granting authors exclusive rights in their works. 
Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File 
Sharing, 17 HARV. 1.L. & TECH. I (2003). In MGM v. Grokster, 545 U.S. _(June 27, 2005), the 
Supreme Court of the United States held that distributors ofa file-sharing "device" can be held liable 
for contributory copyright infringement if their "object" is to "promote its use to infringe copyright." 
Although the Court purported to be restating the reasoning of Sony Corp. of America v. Universal 
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), the ground has shifted away from the amount of non-
infringing use and to the intent of the distributor. Although the case was remanded for further 
proceedings, the Court found sufficient evidence of Grokster's intent that it is hard to imagine the 
lower courts finding anything other than copyright liability. It can be expected that this finding of 
liability will encourage the promoters of a peer-to-peer compulsory license to work all the more 
diligently for such a compromise. 
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To begin with, compulsory licenses are not new to intellectual property. 
They have been invoked to resolve several troublesome technological issues, 
primarily in the past quarter of a century. Some compulsory licenses have been 
moderately successful, but their general track record is disappointing. At best, 
these licenses should be viewed as interim arrangements to preserve a balance 
between the extremes of full and no liability during periods of technological or 
other change.3 But such arrangements are not as successful as, and should yield 
as soon as possible to, private systems of compensation. Even after 210 years of 
copyright law in this country and in the face of new technologies, private 
arrangements still best serve the public interest in encouraging both the creation 
and dissemination of new works. 
As a backdrop for considering a new license in the peer-to-peer 
environment, this paper reviews existing compulsory licenses. We first discuss 
the audio compulsory licenses: (1) the original compulsory license for mechanical 
reproduction of phonorecords, established in the Copyright Act of 1909 and 
preserved in section 115 of the current Act;4 (2) the jukebox compulsory license, 
enacted as section 116 of the 1976 Copyright Act, and repealed in 1993;5 (3) the 
digital audio home recording royalty, established in 1992 in chapter ten of the 
Copyright Act;6 and (4) the digital performance right in sound recordings license, 
established in 1995, set out in section 114 of the current Act.7 
Because the technology and the economics of the video market are different 
from those ofthe audio market, however, we will review separately the television 
compulsory licenses, primarily focusing upon (5) the cable compulsory license, 
adopted as section 111 of the 1976 Act.s We also will briefly consider: (6) the 
3. As discussed below, for example, the cable television compulsory copyright license filled a gap by 
resolving disputes between copyright owners and cable operators for a little more than a decade while 
the multichannel industry was developing. As soon as relations between broadcasters and cable 
operators stabilized, however, the industries migrated to a private law system of negotiated 
settlements under "retransmission consent" statutory provisions. 
4. 17 U.S.C. § l(e)(1909); 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2000). 
5. 17 U.S.C. § 116 (2000) (Former 17 U.S.C. § 116 repealed and replaced by this new § 116, 
December 17,1993,107 Stat. 2309). 
6. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1003-07 (2000). 
7. 17 U.S.c. § 114(d}-{h) (2000). 
8. See infra § II(A). 
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public broadcasting license established in section 118;9 (7) the satellite 
retransmission license enacted in 1988, as set forth in section 119;10 and (8) the 
local-to-Iocal retransmission license enacted in 1999 as section 122 of the current 
Act. I I 
We will conclude by considering other aspects of the copyright system that 
should be borne in mind as we contemplate the adoption of yet another 
compulsory licensing system. 
I. AUDIO COMPULSORY LICENSES 
A. The Compulsory License for Making and Distributing Phonorecords 
The most enduring compulsory license is the original one, adopted in the 
Copyright Act of 1909. The elaborate scheme was Congress's response to the 
Supreme Court's decision in White-Smith v. Apollol2 holding that piano rolls, and, 
by extension, phonorecords, were not "copies" of the musical works they 
recorded. That holding meant that the creators of phonorecords or other 
mechanical reproductions of musical works did not have to pay the owners of 
copyrights in the songs they reproduced. 
In 1909, Congress legislatively overruled the White-Smith case by providing 
that the making of phonorecords or other mechanical versions of songs was 
subject to copyright protection. Congress created the phonorecord compulsory 
license to protect against the monopolization of music by the sound recording 
industry, and to assure that performers would have access to any songs they 
wanted to "cover" by making their own recordings at a reasonable price.13 The 
provision has stood the test of time, increasing from 2 cents per song in 1909 to 
9.1 cents per song (or 1.75 cents per minute of playing time) scheduled to go into 
effect in 2006. 14 
The success of this original compulsory license may have inspired Congress 
to adopt other compulsory licenses in the 1976 Copyright Act. But the 
phonorecord license arose in a context significantly different from any of the other 
compulsory licenses, and particularly the peer-to-peer environment. The 
phonorecord compulsory license does not involve the "pooling" of funds, but 
9. 17 U.S.C. § 118 (2000). 
10. 17 U.S.C. § 119 (2000). 
11. 17 U.S.C. § 122 (2000). 
12. 209 U.S. 1 (1908). 
13. See generally H.R. 2222, 60th Congo (2d Sess. 1909). 
14. See 17 U.S.C. § l(e) (1909); 37 C.F.R. § 2SS.3(m) (1998). 
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rather the direct payment by a user/perfonner (or the perfonner's recording 
company) to the owner of copyright in the underlying musical work (or payments 
made through the Harry Fox Agency as a designated intennediary). 
The phonorecord license thus is simpler to administer than the later, more 
complicated compulsory licensing schemes. It also tracks more closely the private 
contract negotiation that would have occurred in the absence of the compulsory 
license. 15 
At least part of the justification for interfering with the nonnal market in 
musical works was the fact that the users-the perfonners and record companies 
involved in making new versions of older works-also contributed creatively to the 
pool of available versions of songs. This is not the case in the typical peer-to-peer 
transaction, which usually involves the simple multiplication (and potential 
displacement) of copies of works that are already available through commercial 
channels. A different situation might pertain if file sharing produced a large 
number of derivative works, through sophisticated digital editing and 
manipulation. But this has not been the case to date. 
The story of the first compulsory license, however, is not finished. As 
electronic dissemination of musical works displaces the traditional sale of 
phonorecords and CDs, any compulsory license pegged only to the old technology 
soon would be doomed to failure. In 1995, Congress updated section 115 to 
compensate music copyright owners for the digital delivery of works authorized 
under the compulsory license, as well as the sale of old-fashioned "phonorecords" 
(defined broadly enough to include CDS).16 
B. The Jukebox Compulsory License 
Under the 1909 Act, copyright did not extend to playing music on 
jukeboxes, because Congress adopted a specific exception in favor of the jukebox 
industry .17 Although the exception was potentially justified by the assumption that 
jukebox play of music promoted record sales, this unusual free ride by an industry 
that made a lot of money from copyrighted works seemed inconsistent with the 
general principles of copyright. 
In 1976, Congress's response to the inconsistency was to adopt a 
compromise-a compulsory license for the playing of music "by means of 
IS. To this extent, it thus resembles the system of retransmission consent in the cable industry. See 
discussion infra § II (8). 
16. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000); 17 U.S.C. § 115(d)(2000). 
17. 17 U.S.C. § I(e), para. 3 (1909)(now superseded). 
2005] Compulsory Licenses 73 
coin-operated phonorecord players.,,18 The initial fee was set at $8 per jukebox. 
Through periodic adjustments, the fees climbed to almost 8 times that amount 
within a decade. 19 In a two-step set of amendments in 1988 and 1993, Congress 
replaced the fees with "negotiated licenses" agreed to by the affected industries?O 
The current fees have been negotiated at $275 for the first jukebox by any 
particular operator, $55 for the second through tenth jukeboxes, and $48 for each 
additional jukebox.21 
It would be tempting to suggest that Congress viewed the compulsory 
license as a temporary fix, and that the shift to a marketplace alternative was a 
natural and anticipated evolution in the treatment of the jukebox industry-from 
exception to compulsory license to (relatively) free market. Congress's action was 
prompted primarily by concerns that the jukebox compulsory licensing system 
violated U.S. obligations under the Berne Convention, particularly Article 11(1); 
this assures copyright owners the exclusive right in the public performance of their 
works.22 Perhaps the more important lesson of this history is to underscore the 
international context of the copyright system, which we will consider in Section 
ill, below. 
C. The Digital Audio Home Recording Royalty 
Prior to 1992, it was unclear whether the home tape recording of music was 
a copyright violation. On the one hand, manufacturers argued that they were not 
liable under the principles applied to video recorders in the Betamax case;23 and 
rights against home users were, as a practical matter, unenforceable. On the other 
hand, some arguably distinguishing features made the audio market different from 
the video market of 1984. Of particular importance was the emergence of digital 
audio tape ("DAT") as a near-perfect method of making copies. 
In 1992, in response to the issues raised by the new digital technologies, 
Congress passed the Audio Home Recording Act.24 Among other things, the Act 
provided for a statutory fee to be charged on the sale of digital audio recorders 
(generally 2% ofthe manufacturer's or importer's price, with a minimum of$1 and 
a maximum of$8) and digital audio media (generally 3%). The proceeds were to 
18. 17 U.S.C. § 116 (I 976)(now superseded). 
19. 37 C.F.R. § 254.3 (2003). 
20. 17 U.S.C. § 116A (1988); 17 U.S.C. § 116 (1993). 
21. ROBERT A. GoRMAN & JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT: CASES AND MATERIALS 608 (6th ed. 2002). 
22. The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literacy and Artistic Works, art. 11(1), Paris revision, 
July 24, 1971. 
23. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
24. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-10 (2000). 
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be distributed to the owners of copyright in music and sound recordings, based 
upon estimated shares of the market. 
The DAT experience might seem to be a good precedent for a peer-to-peer 
compulsory licensing system, with fees under the new system based upon the price 
ofMP3 recorders and memory devices. The problem is that the DAT technology 
was a non-starter. The fees never have amounted to much more than $4 million 
per year, and the aggravation in collecting and disseminating the funds has been 
disproportionately large.25 P~rhaps more than any other, this license has resulted 
in "spending dollars to chase dimes." It is hardly a model for future legislation. 
D. The Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings License 
Prior to 1995, though there was an exclusive performance right in the 
underlying music, there was no exclusive performance right in sound recordings 
as such. In 1995, however, Congress created such a right. It was limited to the 
digital performance or transmission of such works, with lots of exceptions that 
nullified much of the potential impact of the new right. 26 As part of the package, 
Congress created a compulsory license that applied to some non-interactive digital 
transmission services. Such a compulsory license might seem relatively easy to 
set up, since it involves a relatively finite number of web casters, who do or could 
operate their websites for profit, and who presumably are in a position to absorb 
reasonable performance fees. 
After Congress adopted the complicated new right and incorporated the 
compulsory license into section 114 of the Act, observers waited to see how the 
compulsory license would work out. Even before any fees had been collected 
under the license, however, it became obvious that the statutory language was 
unclear. Did it apply to "streaming audio"? No one knew. By 1998, as part of 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Congress revised the language to clear up 
some of the ambiguities.27 A Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel was established 
to recommend the initial rates for the compulsory license;28 it came up with a 
proposed rate of 0.14 cents for each song streamed on an Intemet-only webcast, 
and 0.07 cents for each song included as part of an AM or FM radio 
retransmission. After much public discussion and complaint, the Librarian of 
25. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE., THE ANNUAL REpORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, available at 
www.copyright.gov/reports/index.html. The Annual Reports of the Register of Copyrights for2001, 
2002, and 2003 state that AHRA fees were $3.32 million in 2000, $4.124 million in 2001, and 
$3.448 million in 2002. 
26. 17 U.S.C. § 114(d) (2000). 
27. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 405(a)(1)-{4), 112 Stat. 2890 (1998). 
28. 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(1 )(2000). 
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Congress adopted a compromise rate of 0.07 cents for each song delivered, 
whether by AM, FM, or Internet-only transmission. 
Many people thought that the rates were outrageous, and that smaller 
operators could not afford them Congress intervened by passing the Small 
Webcaster Settlement Act of2002?9 Currently, the webcasting royalty rates are 
divided into nine categories of digital audio services, depending upon such factors 
as whether the service is commercial or noncommercial. Fees range from as low 
as $200 for noncommercial webcasters devoted primarily to news, talk, and 
sports, to 10% of gross proceeds for such commercial services as XM Satellite 
Radio and SIRIUS Satellite Radio. 
Since its rocky start, the compulsory license has begun generating at least a 
moderate flow of revenue, reaching as high as $35 million in 2005.30 While the 
fees might seem to bode well as a model for a peer-to-peer compulsory license, the 
comparison is misleading. Much of the revenues generated by the new digital 
performance right are attributable to commercial satellite radio services such as 
XM and SIRIUS. Most peer-to-peer exchanges on the Internet, by contrast, will 
presumably be in a non-commercial setting, where revenues are not likely to be 
generated, and funds will not likely be available for distribution. 
II. VIDEO COMPULSORY LICENSES 
A. The Cable Compulsory License 
For almost two decades, the broadcast and cable industries fought over 
whether and how much cable systems should pay rights holders for cable systems' 
retransmission of programs broadcast by television stations. As a first step to 
establish a bargaining advantage, television broadcast networks and producers 
sued to establish that cable use of copyrighted broadcast programming was a 
copyright infringement. Partly out of fear of strangling the then-emerging cable 
industry, the Supreme Court twice flatly held that this type of use was "passive" 
in nature, and thus created no liability.3l 
After the Teleprompter decision, the broadcast and production interests got 
the message that no judicial relief was in sight, and turned their attention to the 
29. Small Webcaster Settlement Act of2002, Pub. L. No. 107-321, 116 Stat. 2780 (2002). 
30. See Ben Sisario, Old Songs Generate New Cash/or Artists, N.Y. TiMES, Dec. 28,2004. § E, at I. 
For current information, see the website run by SoundExchange, the organization assigned the task 
of collecting and distributing the compulsory fees at www.soundexchange.com. 
31. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968) and Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia 
Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974). 
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decades-old Congressional fight over cable fees. The result was a compulsory 
license in section 111 of the 1976 Copyright Revision Act, which went into effect 
in 1978. This hideously complicated provision provided that cable operators 
could carry both local and distant broadcast television signals for a fee mandated 
by the Act, subject to periodic adjustments by the former Copyright Royalty 
Tribunal. (Later, upon the abolition of the Tribunal, Copyright Arbitration 
Royalty Panels were appointed by the Librarian of Congress. Most recently, in 
November 2004, the panels were themselves replaced by a new system of 
Copyright Royalty Judges, to take effect in 2005.) The fee was based upon the 
number of "distant signal equivalents" ("DSEs") that a cable system imported, 
counting a distant independent station as one and a network-affiliated station or 
educational station as 114. The number of DSEs was multiplied by a figure 
initially set by Congress and later adjusted by the Tribunal, to establish the 
percentage of their gross revenues charged for importing distant television 
signals.32 The revenues collected by the licensing system then were divided 
among the copyright owners, after elaborate hearings that typically held up 
distributions for many years. The big winners in this process generally were 
broadcast programming and sports rightsholders.33 
The percentage of gross revenues for each DSE has increased over the years. 
Similarly, the total gross revenues of cable systems has increased steadily every 
year. (See Table I and Graph I, reproduced at the end of this article, showing an 
increase from just over $1 billion in revenues when the Copyright Act was first 
passed, to almost $30 billion in 2002.) But the total payment under the cable 
compulsory license (Graph m actually has decreased in the last decade. After 
peaking near $200 million in 1989, it has gone down to only about $120 million 
in the last few years. (In part, this is offset by an increase in the compulsory 
licensing fees for satellite distribution systems under section 119, described below, 
which in 2002 amounted to almost $69 million.34) 
Why have the royalties under the compulsory license decreased? Quite 
simply, cable systems do not import as many distant signals as in the early days. 
Today, viewers are interested not in distant signals, but rather in satellite 
32. The relevant gross revenues for the computation do not include payments from "on-demand" 
channels, but rather only on "basic" tiers with broadcast signals. Cablevision Sys. Dev. Co. v. 
Motion Picture Ass 'n of Am. Inc., 836 F. 2d 599 (D.C.Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1235. This 
creates a bit of a problem when a cable system includes distant signals in a higher or "enhanced" tier 
-which is uncommon. Since attempting to apportion a system's revenues between broadcast and 
non-broadcast revenues would produce major transactional costs, however, first the Copyright 
Royalty Tribunal and now the Copyright Office have chosen simply to ignore these rare cases. 
33. DANIEL L. BRENNER, MONROE E. PRICE, & MICHAEL MEYERSON, CABLE TELEVISION AND OTHER 
NONBROADCASTVIDEO: LAW AND POLICY § 9.19 (Clark Boardman Callaghan) (\986). 
34. See infra § II B. 
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networks-free, per-channel, or pay-per-view-for which cable operators negotiate 
fees in a free marketplace. Even in its infancy, the cable compulsory license 
system was implemented against the backdrop of FCC regulations that severely 
limited the number ofDSEs a cable system could import.35 While the FCC long 
ago repealed the limitation, the section 111 fees effectively continue the cap on 
distant signals, by pricing the importation of a DSE that would have been barred 
by the earlier FCC rules at about four percent of gross revenue.36 Cable operators 
thus do not view distant signal importation as a useful market strategy. 
Broadcasters and cable operators also have fought over the rebroadcast of 
local over-the-air channels on cable systems within the same viewing area. Under 
the FCC's rules in the 1 970s, cable systems were required to carry local 
programming under "must carry" rules.37 Presumably, the local station operators 
did not lose money by this arrangement: broadcasters kept their local viewers-by 
being carried on cable systems-and were able to charge advertisers for them. The 
cable compulsory license did not compensate for the retransmission of local 
stations, since the cable operators were required to carry these signals in any 
event, and the local broadcasters wanted it that way; the DSE figure was based 
totally upon the importation of signals from outside the viewing area-and not 
upon retransmission of local television signals. 
Most cable subscribers today watch satellite-delivered non-broadcast 
programming, for which the copyright model is not a compulsory license, but 
rather a negotiated contract. The broadcasters quickly began to figure out that the 
real money was in non-broadcast satellite networks. 
With the decrease in carriage of distant signals, payments under section 111 
naturally went down. The statute explicitly requires payments only for signals 
carried beyond their normal licensed area-that is, distant signals.38 Congress' 
theory quite reasonably seems to have been that broadcasters benefited from cable 
carriage of their signals; if the cable operators had any incentive not to carry local 
signals, broadcasters naturally would lose viewers-and hence advertising 
revenues-in their home markets. There was and is no need to impose a 
compulsory copyright scheme on local signals. Indeed, in many cases 
35. Brenner, Price, & Meyerson, supra note 33, at § 9.19. 
36. 17 C.F.R. § 308. 
37. The FCC's "must carry" rules were codified by Congress in the 1992 Cable Television Consumer 
Protection and Competition Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 534-35. The statute and its implementation were 
upheld by the Supreme Court in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) and 
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997). 
38. 17 U.S.c. § 111(d)(I)(B)(I) (2000). See, e.g., Brenner, Price, & Meyerson, supra note 33, at § 
9:15; Ferris & Lloyd, Telecommunications Regulation: Cable, Broadcasting, Satellite, and the 
Internet, § 7.12(1) (LexisNexis 2004). 
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broadcasters assist local systems in receiving high-quality signals, by building 
direct fiberoptic or microwave connections to cable operators. 
After the widespread development of satellite cable channels in the late 
1980s, cable operators had a declining need to import distant signals.39 And since 
systems do not pay for local signals, it was inevitable that copyright payments 
would fall-as discussed and as set forth in Table I and Graph n at the end of this 
article. 
Although beyond the scope of this paper, the change in compulsory 
copyright's significance is a good illustration of government's inability to predict 
rapid changes in market forces. In the decade after section 111 's enactment, 
market changes reduced its importance significantly. Although satellite 
transmission existed at the time of the 1976 Copyright Revision Act, its drafters 
simply did not foresee its effect upon the relevance of signal importation and 
hence of a compulsory copyright scheme oriented around distant signals. 
At the same time that section 111 was becoming less relevant, broadcasters 
and cable operators were moving to a system of private negotiations. To 
accommodate the shift, Congress, in the Cable Television Consumer Protection 
and Copyright Act of 1992, provided for "retransmission consent" ("RTC") as an 
alternative to must-carry and effectively a supplement to section 111 royalties.40 
(Section 111 applies to owners of copyright in the individual programs; RTC 
extends rights to the broadcasters themselves, based upon their broadcast signal, 
and without regard to the ownership of any copyrights.) 
Effective in 1993, section 325(b)(3) of the Communications Act allowed 
broadcasters and rights holders to negotiate for permission to carry their signals. 
This approach carries with it a risk under section 325(b)( 4); if a broadcaster is 
unable to reach a retransmission consent agreement with a cable operator, it gives 
up its right to cable carriage locally under the current version of the "must carry" 
rules. But broadcasters appear to have sought such arrangements quite eagerly. 
Instead of competing for relatively small slices of the compulsory copyright 
pie, after 1993 broadcasters seem to have preferred using the RTC option to 
negotiate for compensation. This apparently has not resulted in any purely 
financial windfalls. Instead, to the extent that the results of these negotiations are 
visible, they seem to reflect an increased reliance upon a form of barter. 
Because the RTC deals are proprietary in nature, their details are never 
disclosed. Aside from the contracts' private nature, cable operators naturally fear 
39. Distant signals still are important in some circumstances, where a station in one market is 
particularly attractive in another-because of program content, language, or the like. For example, 
cable systems in Puerto Rico carry several New York City signals; because many Puerto Rican 
residents have friends or relatives in New York City, developments there naturally are of interest. 
40. 47 U.S.C. § 325(b) (2000). 
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that if they make a highly favorable deal with one popular local broadcaster, 
others will demand the same terms. Nevertheless, discussions with cable industry 
executives indicate some broad outlines of RTC agreements. 
According to an industry trade association representative,41 RTC deals never 
include outright monetary compensation. In the early days of RTC, a few 
broadcasters demanded cash and met instant rejection.42 Instead, these 
arrangements generally involve reciprocal dealings. For example, it was not an 
accident that shortly after the major broadcast networks shifted to retransmission 
consent negotiations, most of them struck industry-wide cable agreements to 
create new cable networks with a network "brand"--e.g., CNBC, MSNBC, FNC. 
The broadcasters were anxious to expand into new video media, which resulted 
in new network-run cable channels. In some cases, cable operators received 
favorable terms under these agreements-for example, carriage rights to both a 
broadcast and a cable network for less than the cost of the fonner alone. 
The key to these transactions was that the cable industry could give the 
networks something more valuable than small cash payments-that is, national 
coverage. (In some cases, these arrangements also exist between cable operators 
and strong non-network group-owned stations.) Cable operators claim that they 
do not agree to or continue to carry cable networks with little audience interest. 
And some networks have had little success in launching new cable networks, even 
with the help ofRTC agreements. 
The general counsel at a major cable company indicated that other types of 
deals also are customary.43 Since systems generally have excess advertising time 
on cable satellite channels, they often give or sell it at nominal rates to local 
network affiliates for running promotional material for upcoming network 
programs. Alternatively, an RTC agreement may commit cable operators to buy 
promotional time from local stations, at relatively low rates. Or broadcasters and 
cable operators may agree to share unused production time in their studios, for 
nominal payments. 
This combination of carrying broadcasters' cable networks, giving excess 
advertising time to broadcasters, and sharing production capacity mayor may not 
have real economic value. As the cable general counsel above noted, "It's the 
principle rather than the economic value. No one wants to admit paying cash. 
There would be network carriage and advertising agreements in any event, but the 
existence ofRTC encourages and increases it." 
41. Confidential interview with senior management, cable trade association, December 14, 2004. 
42. Confidential interview with chief executive officer, cable multiple systems operator, November 18, 
2004. 
43. Confidential interview with general counsel of cable multiple systems operator, December 17,2004. 
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While the compulsory licensing system may have represented an unhappy 
truce in the 1970s, it has been replaced to a large extent by negotiated agreements 
between the broadcasters and owners of programming, and the cable as well as 
satellite operators who control access to most viewers. Like the jukebox 
compulsory license that eventually yielded to industry negotiations, perhaps the 
best compulsory licenses are the ones that fade away-which section 111 basically 
began to do after its first decade. 
B. The Other Television Compulsory Licenses 
The Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1994 created a compulsory license to do 
for direct broadcast satellite (DBS) operators the same thing as section 111 did for 
cable systems. Although the systems vary in significant ways (for example, 
section 119 bases the fees upon a certain price per subscriber, instead of a 
percentage of gross revenues), the lesson for Qther compulsory licenses is the 
same. A compulsory license can work, but is not simple, and may require an 
administratively burdensome set of regulations. 
The treatment of other evolving retransmission systems, such as systems 
delivered over fiber-{)ptic phone cables, is up in the air. A 1997 Copyright Office 
Report favored extending a compulsory license to cover telephone companies that 
retransmit broadcast signals, but voiced skepticism about the advisability of 
compulsory licensing systems on the Intemet.44 
The public broadcasting or "noncommercial broadcasting" license fees set 
up pursuant to section 118 of the Copyright AdS should be considered sui 
generis. Under that section, fees have been set for the performance of musical 
compositions (providing lump-sum payments of several million dollars to ASCAP 
and BMI by PBS and NPR, and a few hundred dollars by college or university 
44. See A Review ofthe Copyright Licensing Regimes Covering Retransmission of Broadcast Signals 
(August 1997), www.copyright.gov/reports/study.pdf. 
The Copyright Office concludes that it would be inappropriate for Congress to grant 
Internet retransmitters the benefits of compulsory licensing. The primary argument 
against an Internet compulsory license is the vast technological and regulatory 
differences between Internet retransmitters and the cable systems and satellite 
carriers that now enjoy compulsory licensing. The instantaneous worldwide 
dissemination of broadcast signals via the Internet poses major issues regarding the 
national and international licensing of the signals that have not been fully addressed 
by federal and international policymakers, and it would be premature for Congress 
to legislate a copyright compulsory license to benefit Internet retransmitters. 
Executive summary, www.copyright.gov/reports/exsum.pdf.at13. 
45. 17 U.S.C. § 118 (2000). 
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public broadcasting entities) and for pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works 
(generally in the tens of dollars per use). 
In 1999, Congress added section 122 to the Copyright Act.46 It grants 
satellite carriers the right to retransmit broadcast signals within the intended local 
market of a television broadcast station, ostensibly putting them more on a par 
with cable operators. The license is royalty-free, on the assumption that the 
original broadcaster benefits by reaching viewers in its service area. As such, the 
provision is more an exemption from copyright liability than a traditional 
compulsory licensing system. The primary feature is that the satellite carrier must 
provide a list identifying all subscribers to whom the satellite carrier retransmits. 
m. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
In considering the treatment of new technologies within the overall 
framework of copyright, it is important to remember that copyright is not 
necessarily, or even principally, a barrier to the dissemination of creative works. 
As stated by the Supreme Court in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation 
Enterprises:47 "it should not be forgotten that the Framers intended copyright 
itself to be the engine of free expression. By establishing a marketable right to the 
use of one's expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and 
disseminate ideas . . ." 
For example, ASCAP, perhaps the best existing model for a collective rights 
organization, was not created by a compulsory license set by Congress, but 
resulted from collective bargaining among the various parties, with periodic 
oversight by the courts through the lens of antitrust law,48 and periodic 
adjustments of rights by Congress (as in the so-called "Fairness in Music 
Licensing Act of 1998'>49). 
An initial determination that a use is covered by copyright gives a copyright . 
owner considerable leverage in setting the fees for distribution or performance of 
such works, of course, but the copyright owner makes no money if there are no 
distributions. And an initial determination that copyright does not extend to a 
particular use, such as in the case of jukeboxes, cable, or the Betamax, will shift 
the bargaining power in favor of the users in any later consideration of a 
compulsory license. 
46. 17 U.S.C. § 122 (2000). 
47. 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985). 
48. E.g, Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys. Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979). 
49. Codified, in part, as 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(B) (2000). 
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On the other hand, a compulsory license is not the only means of placing 
limitations upon the rights of copyright owners. There are dozens of specific 
exceptions and limitations to the rights of copyright, including several in section 
11 OSO (covering certain "nonprofit" uses), and limitations resulting from basic 
principles of copyright, such as fair use, the idea-expression distinction, and the 
limitations upon copyright in works of utility. Many socially beneficial uses of 
copyrighted works on the Internet, even by people not owning the copyright, will 
be protected by these doctrines. 
Although much maligned in the Internet community, the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA)SI gives owners of works the right to control their works 
through copy protection systems and the use of copy management information 
systems. Anyone seriously considering a compulsory license will have to work 
through the interplay between such a license and the workings of the DMCA. 
For example, would the existence of a compulsory license to disseminate 
works on the Internet trump the DMCA? Presumably not, unless we essentially 
want to dismantle the DMCA and require that copyright owners unlock their 
copyright protection systems. If the existence of a compulsory license lessened 
the economic value of copyrighted works, particularly those initially supplied in 
digital form, the net effect of a compulsory license might be to convince many 
copyright owners to adopt more technically intrusive copy protection systerns-a 
result that would presumably undermine the whole purpose behind such a 
compulsory license. 
One also must keep in mind the increasing international role in deciding 
copyright policy. Take, for example, the recently proposed "Public Domain 
Enhancement ACt,,,S2 introduced in Congress in 2003, that would impose a 
maintenance fee for continuing copyright beyond fifty years from first pUblication. 
Whatever the merits of such a requirement, it seems to fly directly in the face of 
the Berne Convention,S3 which prohibits such formalities as a limitation on 
copyright. It was only in 1988 that the United States finally did away with the 
requirement of copyright notice and registration, as a condition to joining Berne 
in the first place.54 
Another recent international development of considerable relevance is the 
updating of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to include intellectual 
property rights, under the new structure of the World Trade Organization. In a 
50. 17 U.S.C. § 110. 
51. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-05 (2000). 
52. Introduced as H.R. 2601, 108th Congo (2003). 
53. Berne Convention, supra note 23, art. 5(2). 
54. 17 U.S.C. § 411 (2000). 
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recent decision,55 a WTO panel held the U.S. exemption of certain restaurants and 
business establishments for retransmission of musical works received over the 
airwaves (section 110(5» to be in violation of Berne obligations. The panel 
disapproved of national exceptions or limitations that "conflict with a normal 
exploitation of the work." It is quite possible that too broad a compulsory license 
also would be in violation of Berne obligations, triggering possible retaliatory 
sanctions in the WTO. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This discussion is not intended to preempt or forestall consideration of a new 
compulsory licensing system to balance competing interests in the emerging 
peer-to-peer environment. But the track record of prior compulsory licenses, the 
differences between those licenses and a peer-to-peer license, and other copyright 
as well as international considerations suggest that caution is in order before 
jumping headlong into any quick fix. 
55. Panel Report, United Stales - Section 110(5) of the Us. Copyright Act, WTIDS 1601R (June 15, 
2000). 
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Table I 
Section 111 Fees Compared to Gross Basic Industry Revenues 
1978·2002 
Year Cable Royalty Fees* Basic Cable Revenue ** 
1978 $ 12,910,027 $ 1,147,000,000 
1979 $ 15,889,793 $ 1,332,000,000 
1980 $ 20,044,492 $ 1,615,000,000 
1981 $ 30,886,119 $ 2,023,000,000 
1982 $ 41,156,873 $ 2,515,000,000 
1983 $ 72,774,961 $ 3,041,000,000 
1984 $ 92,272,898 $ 3,534,000,000 
1985 $ lO4,777,269 $ 4,138,000,000 
1986 $ 124,725,475 $ 4,887,000,000 
1987 $ 163,163,192 $ 6,016,000,000 
1988 $ 193,103,897 $ 7,345,000,000 
1989 $ 208,126,070 $ 8,670,000,000 
1990 $ 170,335,290 $ 10,174,000,000 
1991 $ 180,755,077 $ 11,418,000,000 
1992 $ 188,537,115 $ 12,433,000,000 
1993 $ 185,359,636 $ 13,528,000,000 
1994 $ 161,271,446 $ 15,164,000,000 
1995 $ 165,867,789 $ 16,860,000,000 
1996 $ 177 ,604,829 $ 18,395,000,000 
1997 $ 154,389,741 $ 20,383,000,000 
1998 $ 108,244,085 $ 21,830,000,000 
1999 $ 108,240,071 $ 23,135,000,000 
2000 $ 120,177,595 $ 24,729,000,000 
2001 $ 121,845,046 $ 27 ,031,000,000 
2002 $ 120,795,554 $ 28,492,000,000 *** 
*Source US Copyright Office, July 2003 
[Vol. 30 
**Source U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2002 
***Kagan, World Media, a PRIMEDIA Company, Broadband Cable Financial Databook, 2002 
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